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Fighting Terror with Error:




Rationale for Financial 
Controls
• Reduce possible harm
• Monitor militant activities
• Reconstruct events-conspiracies
• Force tactical changes and 




• "We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them against 
each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, 
and bring them to justice."  President George W. Bush; 
September 24, 2001
• AML/AC
• “…remittances…are a tremendous source of capital 
flowing directly into the hands of consumers and 
households in the developing world. We agreed to work 
on reducing the roadblocks for people sending money 
back to their families. This means identifying and 
removing the barriers that slow the flow of remittances, 
make transactions expensive or encourage money to 
flow through informal channels” US Treasury Secretary 
John Snow, February 2004, G7.7/1/2005 4
Objectives
• Crime Control
– Transparency (operators, clients and traceability)
– Deterrence and prevention of abuse
– Prevent terrorist finance (asset seizures)
– Monitor militants
• Enhance free remittance/capital flows
– Lower cost and access to widen range of options for 
remittances
– Compliance
– Consumer protection7/1/2005 5
Risks of erroneous 
AML/CTF
• Driving networks/transactions underground
• Collateral damage
• Alienation of ethnic groups
• Neglect of more serious problems
• Increase of economic/other asymmetries
• More grievances = fertile ground for 
recruiting militants7/1/2005 6
Problem
• Overemphasis on certain financial flows at 
the expense of riskier ones
• Example of money transfer regulation and 
reliance on private sector7/1/2005 7
Comparing rates Comparing rates
PKR-DRH rates in various markets on 8 December, 2003 
in Dubai.
Hawala rate 12,660
Money exchange rate 12,391
Draft/bank rate 11,905 [minus fees]
Options PKR for 1,000 DRH7/1/2005 8
Comparative amounts received in Pakistan for 100 USD from Dubai
5920 100 NIL Hawala
5858 109.52 9.52 Western Union
5890 112.25 - 127.22 12.25 - 27.22 TT (Bank)
5901 – 5910 109.52 - 116.33 9.52 - 16.33 TT (exchange house)
5890 102.722 - 106.80 2.722 - 6.80 Draft (Bank)
5901 – 5910 101.36 - 102.722 1.36 - 2.722 Draft (exchange 
house)
PK Rupees received Total paid Charges Method of remittance7/1/2005 9
What is the cost of current 
regulations?
• International reg. environment
• US regulation of money transfers
– Federal v. States regulation
– Due process and quality of evidence (al 
Barakaat case)7/1/2005 10
Country  Regulatory Regime  KYC threshold  Record keeping  Filings  Fees 
Canada No  registration/  no 
licensing 
CAN$ 3,000  5 years  STR 
CTR above CAN$ 10,000 
none 
France  Full bank license  Comprehensive 
prudential 
regime 
n/a n/a  n/a 
Hong Kong  Registration  HK$ 20,000  6 years  STR  none 
Germany  Licensing   € 2,500  6 years  STR  € 1,000/percentage 
of annual turnover 
– min. € 650 
India  1) wire transfer 
services: Registration 
2) other forms of 
remittances, incl. banking 
channels, under the 
‘Money Transfer Service 
Scheme’: licensing 
 
All transactions  10 years  STR (once FIU is set up 
and becomes operational) 
? 
Italy Licensing  €  12,500  10  years  STR  none 
Netherlands Licensing  All transactions  5 years  STR 
CTR over € 2,000 
Percentage of 
annual turnover – 
min € 3,000 
Spain Licensing  All transactions  6 years  STR 




1) Hawala: registration 




2) AED 2,000 
1) n/a 
2) all transactions 






Registration    5 years  STR 
 
GB£ 60 per office 
USA - Federal  Registration  US$ 3,000  5 years  SAR over US$ 2,000 





• Reporting Suspicious Transactions
•K Y C




• Bond, capitalization, net worth, fees7/1/2005 13 License $ 500, 
renewal $750
$25,000-1,000,000 as determined by 
the Commission







Min. $300,000 determined by 
commissioner
$ 100,000 for first location, $ 50,000 
for each additional up to $ 400,000
$25,000 per location up to 
$1,000,000
Texas





$10 per/l – ren.
$100- $10 p/l
Min. $100,000 or average daily 
outstanding for 12 months - max. 
$2,000,000
$35,000-$500,000 depending on 
number of locations
Illinois
$ 500 annual + 
$1,000 investig.
Min. $ 500,000, unless 
superintendent determines lower 
amount suffices




Lic.: up to 
$4,000
Biannual fee 
$25 per location 
up to $5,000
(1) min $100,000 up to $1,000,000
(2) foreign remitters: depending on 
volume $25,000-$100,000 -
commissioner may require up to 
$900,000
(1) min. $100,000 plus $25,000 per 
location or agent in NJ up to 
$1,000,000.
(2) $50,000 for foreign money 
transmitter plus $10,000 per 
location or agent up to $400,000
New Jersey
Appl.. $500 plus 
$50 per agent; 
renewal $1000 
$50 per agent 
up to $20,000
Set by commission rule – max. $ 
250,000 – up to $500,000 in 
exceptional circumstances - may be 
waived upon request
min. 100,000 plus $ 50,000 per 
location in FL up to $ 500,000 - may 
be waived upon request
Florida
$ 5,000 plus $50 
per agent
Determined by Commissioner min $ 500,000 in equity California





• 100s of legitimate accounts closed
• Underserved and undeserved: Private industry 
ended up deciding who would get indispensable 
services and who would not
• Wrong priorities anyway: formal sector/trade7/1/2005 15
Remittances and terrorist 
finance
• Disconnect between tons of money and 
lack of resources in discovered cases
• Wide range of fund raising and transfer 
methods used by militants
• Informal channels not the most important 
one
• Most 9/11 funds transferred through banks 
and formal remitters7/1/2005 16
Hawala and AQ
• AQ used several trusted hawaladars in S. 
Asia and M. East, while operating in 
Afghanistan
• No use for 9/11
• No cases of hawala related terrorist 
finance cases in US-Europe so far
• Barakaat
• Xpress route to regulation without 
understanding or consent7/1/2005 17
Cost of Attacks
• Madrid bombings - $1,000 (UN: less than 
$10,000)
• Bali nightclub bombings - $20,000 (UN: less 
than $50,000)
• US embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania – 10,000 (UN: less than $50,000)
• Attacks in Istanbul – UN: less than $40,000 
• 9/11 attacks – $400-500k







• No terrorism charges filed – unlicensed money 
transfer charges
• Names still on the lists
• Unsubstantiated allegations reiterated in FATF 
report 2 weeks ago7/1/2005 19
• We saw 9/11 funds flow through formal institutions – no 
adverse consequences against them. We saw no funds 
flow through Barakaat and yet we devastated the most 
successful business in Somalia. What message does 
this convey? Benign regulation pursuing transparency? 
Forcing banks to go overboard while MSBs go 
underground?
• How is the message altered or supported by subsequent 
actions? Answer by looking at ICE data – no 
independent analysis of cases and results, no transfer of 
cases to FBI, but WP reports that very few had anything 
to do with terrorism at all.7/1/2005 20
May 23, 2005 press release
• ... nationwide campaign by ICE agents 
against unlicensed money transmittal 
businesses and underground “hawalas” 
has resulted in the arrest of 140 
individuals, 138 criminal indictments, and 
the seizure of more than $25.5 million in 
illicit proceeds since the enactment of the 
USA Patriot Act, which requires such 
businesses to be licensed and registered. 7/1/2005 21
Upside-down control; 
Regulatory Externalities: Overboard and Underground
Banks, MSBs, immigrants, traders, regulators, law 
enforcement, the public and the international 
community unhappy about the current regulatory 
regime. 7/1/2005 22
Mosquitoes, Elephants and 
Balanced Regulation7/1/2005 23
Fighting a war on terror and 
shooting ourselves in the foot
• Networks of terror v. networks against terror
• Current efforts in need of evaluation and 
improvement
• Away from a bulldozer approach to regulatory 
symmetry
• Away from embedded academics, media and 
single-cause NGOs
• Shift towards more balanced, consensus based, 
genuinely collaborative, international  effort7/1/2005 24
Context of Financial 
Controls
• The “regulatory tsunami”: UNTOC, UNCAC, 
AML/CFT
• Main goal: fight serious crime
• Other goals too: security, peace, good governance, 
human rights, poverty, economic growth, public 
health, the environment
• Externalities: privatization of controls, less 
accountability, risk of injustice, economic disruptions
• Ignorance of externalities, persistence and 
thoughtless application: “regulatory fundamentalism”
• Legitimacy v. “paper compliance” and illusions of 
success7/1/2005 25
Recommendations
• Establish facts on informal remittance 
infrastructures and comparative risks 
• Look carefully into trade issues
• Enforce laws in context of wider social objectives
• Smart use of technologies and human capital
• Outreach and two-way communication with 
stakeholders and participants in markets
• Role of private sector – proactive and innovative 
on what to report and how to regulate






Thank you so much Thank you so much